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 ABSTRACT 
 
Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which 
began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am 
one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the 
message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that 
it never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with 
Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath of fresh air when they 
discuss cognitive science (imagining they are still doing philosophy). As W 
showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal 
and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology. They occur not only in all 
thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. It’s easy to find 
examples in Hawking, Weinberg, Penrose, Green, who of course have no idea 
they have left science and entered metaphysics, that the statement they just 
made is not a matter of fact at all but a matter of conceptual (linguistic) 
confusion. “Law, event, space, time, force, matter, proof, connection, cause, 
follows, physical”, etc., all have clear uses in certain technical contexts, but 
these blend insensibly into quite different uses that have little in common but 
the spelling. 
 
Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, 
showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how 
our psychology (language) works and with this outline and the references I 
give it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the world 
in place of the metaphysical fantasies. If I were to debate Shoemaker we 
would never get beyond the title. 
 
Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
  
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in 
Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 
132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make 
it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity 
for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 
3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” Blue Book p18 (1933) 
 
 
“The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one we thought quite innocent.” Wittgenstein, PI p308 
 3  
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
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causal explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive 
science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference 
by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used 
to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational 
model of vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is 
simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle 
PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
--- Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
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that philosophy (in this context) is descriptive psychology. 
 
 
Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which 
began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am 
one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the 
message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that 
it never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with 
Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath of fresh air when they 
discuss cognitive science (imagining they are still doing philosophy). As W 
showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal 
and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology. They occur not only in all 
thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. It’s easy to find 
examples in Hawking, Weinberg, Penrose, Green, who of course have no idea 
they have left science and entered metaphysics, that the statement they just 
made is not a matter of fact at all but a matter of conceptual (linguistic) 
confusion. “Law, event, space, time, force, matter, proof, connection, cause, 
follows, physical”, etc., all have clear uses in certain technical contexts, but 
these blend insensibly into quite different uses that have little in common but 
the spelling. 
 
Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, 
showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how 
our psychology (language) works and with this outline and the references I 
give it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the world 
in place of the metaphysical fantasies. If I were to debate Shoemaker we 
would never get beyond the title. As noted above “The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent.”  The trick is already apparent in the title and if we let that slip the 
nonsense will never stop. "Physical realization" can be taken many ways and 
most of the time it is being used here in very peculiar ones. Likewise, for 
many other words, and W saw these tricks and dissected them in great detail 
beginning mainly in the Blue and Brown Books and continuing for the next 
20 years. 
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Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, 
problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship 
between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary 
truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European 
philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful 
array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn 
centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. 
He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to 
human understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of 
the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow 
reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, 
time and space are innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages 
and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly 
describable in language, this being possible only with terms that substitute 
for public behavior (the impossibility of private language). He invented truth 
tables and predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter 
designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive 
the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, 
designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a 
modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently 
completed by others.  He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist 
since he constantly explained the necessity of the innate background and 
demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the psychology 
behind the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He 
noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social 
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interaction. He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and 
the computational theory of mind, long before practical computers. He 
decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from 
being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few 
have learned since. 
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, 
so after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from 
Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p 
be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but 
it is not the case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not 
the case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, 
attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why 
can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? 
Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can 
one know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? 
And so on – through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only 
to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, 
forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being 
conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of perception and their 
cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is 
the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang 
together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their 
point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context 
dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific 
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knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can 
contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s 
cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
I will offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy 
in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other 
books by and about these two geniuses, who provide a clear description of 
higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as 
the WS framework. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
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The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 
3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s 
“impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate 
mental states to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and 
doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind 
direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my terminology in this 
table. 
 
A detailed explanation of the table is given in my other writings.  
 
 
 
 
 10  
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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Detailed explanations for this table are given in many of my other articles. 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior (e.g. metaphysics etc) is 
the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms from the 
effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart 
not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities to act), but the logical extensions of 
S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, 
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slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, 
propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- 
the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, 
Hacker etc). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Referential (CSR), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and 
are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there 
will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and 
discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the 
norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without 
involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference 
engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", 
"background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary 
Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure 
of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
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contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and 
is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and 
Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW 
p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" 
as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid 
automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast 
arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 
composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
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only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality 
of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy 
before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W 
showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on 
certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our 
inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out 
DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed 
consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and 
the Pope wish to help the poor because it is right but the ultimate cause is a 
change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their 
distant ancestors. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which 
produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
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consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I 
think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as 
there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 
Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as `EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence in a 
context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it 
lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I 
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should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were 
asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS and 
my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express 
and which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially 
those of speech. 
 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, with 
rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts. And 
one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled 
by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary 
public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many 
times that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared axiomatic 
psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as clear as 
day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’ as noted p191 of 
WAP. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) and 
W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection above and in my reviews of Budd, 
Johnston and several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that the causal relation and 
word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to describing 
why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist 
in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human 
behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI 
p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern ‘functionalist’, 
‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms. See my review of Carruthers’ ‘The 
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Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example. 
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact. Unlike other cartoon views of life, they 
are too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so 
unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Unfortunately, not so with other cartoon theories like SSSM, BS and TPI, widely 
shared by religions, governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history, literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well-known facts, such as that 
personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their 
adoptive siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street. Religions 
big and small, political movements, and economics often generate or embrace 
already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit 
forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, wishful thinking and 
selfishness and help to accelerate the destruction of the earth (the real purpose of 
nearly every social practice).  The point is to realize that these fantasies are on a 
continuum and have the same source. All of us are born with a cartoon view of life 
and few ever grow out of it. But the world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is 
being played out as the cartoons collide with reality. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. This is truly sad, but it is absolutely scandalous that the 
same is true of nearly all philosophy texts. 
 
